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I. ABSTRACT
Modernization relies on law as the means of transformation.
Democratization and development strategies of the last 20 years,
such as the Washington consensus and its successor: good
governance and institution building, have embraced the
instrumentalization of law in order to create democratic societies
and market economies. In these great processes of transformation,
from regime changes in Eastern Europe to state building across
Central Asia, the process of lawmaking rests upon premises that
have a tendency to perpetuate transition without transforming the
relationship of the individual to power. This alienizing feature of
transition is reflected in lawmaking practices. In this paper, I argue
that a wider participation in the lawmaking process enhances the
legitimacy of the democratic regime, and it helps to fill the gap
between the law in the book and the law in action. I rest my thesis
on the premise that the reformation of laws, and therefore the
system, is characterized by a dichotomy between the legality and
the legitimacy of the lawmaking process. I analyze and expose two
different and contradictory patterns that are inherent in lawmaking
processes in countries in transition. On the one hand, a rule of law
society presupposes clear, transparent and predictable rules, a
certain formalism associated with modern states and societies. On
the other hand, the flexible nature of transition demands solutions
outside the legal framework. I use dichotomies such as legality and
legitimacy, expertise and wider participation to analyze the
contents of lawmaking practices as well as the role of international
actors and elites in the democratization and development process.
Juxtaposing transformation with participation, this paper elucidates
the practices of modern lawmaking in societies in transition.
I should have sought a country, in which the right of
legislation was vested in all the citizens; for who can
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judge better than they of the conditions under which they
had best dwell together in the same society?
Jean Jacques Rousseau,
Discourse on the Origin
of Inequality
II. INTRODUCTION
The process of transition from one political regime to another,
in the last twenty years, has required structural political and
economic reforms. These reforms in turn have relied on the role of
law as an instrument of social change.1 Thus for instance, the
political and economic changes of the 1990s in Eastern Europe
were followed by the establishment of a new legal order, which
was necessary to foster democratization, and create the market
economies.2 On the economic front, the transformation of Eastern
Europe in the early 1990s followed the model of shock therapies
prescribed in the Washington consensus as quick liberalization,
privatization and stabilization.3 During these great processes of
transformation, the social dimension of the state was either

1.
In twenty years of transition in Albania, between 1990 and 2010,
approximately 3000 new laws and thousands of by-laws were adopted. Data
gathered
from
the
database
of
the
Albanian
Parliament,
http://www.parliament.al. (last visited April 21, 2011). See generally European
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, The Law in Transition Series,
http://www.ebrd.com/pages/research/publications/newsletters/archive/archive.sh
tml. (last visited April 21, 2011), for a description on the launch of legal reform
projects. By Eastern Europe I am referring to all the former socialist countries
east of Germany, not including the Soviet Union.
2.
In contrast to the democratization in Eastern Europe, a post third
wave of democratization in Central Asia seems to rely more upon conventional
norms of democratization through Constitution making and power sharing
agreements. In Nepal, for instance, the process of transition from monarchy
towards a republican form of government is relying almost exclusively on the
adoption of a Constitution, which is one of the conditions of the peace process
between the Maoist guerrillas and the former royal army. See Reports of the
Secretary-General on the Request of Nepal for United Nations Assistance in
Support
of
its
Peace
Process,
available
at
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Countries/Pages/SecretaryGeneralReportsNP.aspx
(last visited April 21, 2011).
3.
See generally, Alexander N. Domrin et al., Ten Years of Legal
Reform in the Former Soviet Union: A "Progress" Report, 93 PROCEEDINGS OF
THE ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
235 (Mar. 24-27, 1999).
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abandoned or relegated to the exigencies of the market.4 At this
moment, we come across the first paradox of transition. On the one
hand, legal reform aims at democratizing the societies and creating
the necessary legal framework that would legitimize the new
regime. The assumption is that legal reform would either be
forward or backward looking, leading or following social
developments, attempting to formalize or regulate them. 5 It does
so, however, by following one of the two dogmas of development,
i.e. the neoliberal model or the good governance and institution
building. In both paradigms, the emphasis is on economic reforms
and institutions rather than on maintaining the social dimension of
the state.6
On the other hand, the abandonment of the social role by the
state undermines the legitimacy of the new democratic regime.
This becomes particularly acute when considering that the
totalitarian regime based its legitimacy on performance, that is to
say on the role of the state as a social regulator. Since most of the
new governments face an uphill battle regarding performance, the
social dimension of the state is reduced while the performance is
simply not there. In a situation where constituents perceive the
legitimacy of regimes connected closely with performance, the
withdrawal of the social elements threatens the legitimacy of the
new democracies. Further, the method of reformation exacerbates
the distrust towards governments, and in turn the legitimacy of the
law. The reforms are typically adopted on the basis of a top-down
approach that tends to reinforce the belief that transition is
permanent. The process of establishing a new legal order is
conditioned by the relationship between domestic and international
actors. The latter have influenced the understanding of law and
also stimulated the need for legal reform projects. This immense
legal reform took place in all former socialist countries, in what

4.
While the state was obliged to abandon the regulation on social
services, that did not mean that society was left unregulated. The emergence of
informal law filled the vacuum left in place by the withdrawal of the state.
5.
See PETER FITZPATRICK, THE MYTHOLOGY OF MODERN LAW (1992)
(when discussing the presumption that law and society are inseparable and that
law governs all men).
6.
It should be said the in recent years the two paradigms are not
mutually exclusive.
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Gianmaria Ajani calls an international traffic of legal ideas.7 It is
worth emphasizing that the existence of a legal base does not
automatically translate into optimal operation of laws in everyday
life. The large number of laws adopted, or what I call “the inflation
of legislation,” is devoid of any significant impact on how the
society functions.
There are two features inherent in the transition process. The
first is characterized by the problematic nature of reforms
themselves; the second refers to the process through which these
reforms are adopted.8 In this paper, I use a dichotomy between the
legality and legitimacy of legal reform projects to analyze the
practices of actors involved in lawmaking. Against this
background, I argue for a more participatory process of reforms as
a step for adding legitimacy to the new regime, and also
subsequently to the transformation process itself. In turn, this
increased participation contributes towards enhancing the
legitimacy of laws. A wider participation of the public is necessary
to ameliorate the alienation in the relationship of the individual to
governance and government.9 The problem identified in
democratization processes is that there is transition without
transformation of the relationship of the individual to power. While
participation could add legitimacy to laws and address the
democratic deficit, it does not necessarily follow that the process
itself is the only missing piece of the puzzle.10 The very nature of
7.
Gianmaria Ajani, By Chance and Prestige: Legal Transplants in
Russia and Eastern Europe, 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 93, 95 (1995).
8.
On the lack of a theory on large scale institutional transformation
see Matjaz Nahtigal, Remarks, in Alexander N. Domrin et al., Ten Years of
Legal Reform in the Former Soviet Union: A "Progress" Report, 93
PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 235, 239 (1999) (Matjaz states that “Central and Eastern
Europe had no broad theoretical knowledge on how reform is to be coordinated
among several branches of government, or between the government and the
private sector, the government and civil society or the government and pressure
groups. We had no experience on how to run things without the government. So
the immediate withdrawal of government from every level of society caused an
institutional vacuum, which did not allow for development to arise from the
bottom up, but, rather, generated an intermediate struggle for private
ownership.”).
9.
I adopt a wide definition of the public as essentially including
anyone with a representative function, and, of course, elites.
10.
For an account of the need for local actors to understand legal
norms see Daniel Berkowitz et al., The Transplant Effect, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 1,
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the paradigms of change, such as the neoliberal prescriptions as
well as the good governance and institution building, on which
democratization and development are premised, ought to be
addressed as well. However, for the purpose of this paper, I focus
on the dynamics of the process. A wider participation is one of the
components of a successful transformation process, along with the
nature of the development paradigms, institutional capacities, and
the political will of the elites.11
The goal of this paper therefore is to examine the nature of the
transition process as it is reflected in the operation of legal reform
programs and lawmaking practices. This analysis and approach are
in the function of exposing two different and contradictory patterns
that accompany the lawmaking process in transitional countries.
On the one hand, the contemporary understanding of a rule of law

163 (2003), and Katharina Pistor, The Standardization of Law and Its Effect on
Developing Economies, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 97 (2002). Berkowitz writes that
for law to be effective it has to be meaningful in the context in which it is
applied, while Pistor makes a reference to the need for embedding laws in a
local culture. But see Kevin E. Davis & Michael J. Trebilcock, Legal Reforms
and Development, 22 THIRD WORLD Q. 1, 21 (2001), and Thomas W Waelde &
James L. Gunderson, Legislative Reform in Transition Economies: Western
Transplants: A Short-Cut to Social Market Economy, 43 THE INT‟L AND COMP.
L. Q. 2, 347, 361 (1994) (for an account on the need for institutions in
transition). Davis and Trebilcock argue that the current wave of legal reforms
must be situated in a broader agenda of public sector reform if these are not to
suffer the same fate as the reforms inspired by the original law and development
movement. Waelde and Gunderson write, “any effort at mere legislative reform
will fail if it does not cover as well, or more so, the challenges of helping to
build up the organisations required and the institutional environment within
which a legal culture can emerge and flourish. Substantive legal reform and
institution building must therefore be implemented together so that each
reinforces the other . . . The effectiveness of law in the economic and social
reality of a nation is usually intimately linked to the institutional set-up of
government and economic organisations and the shape and focus of social and
economic forces and their interaction.” While this is true that one needs a
bureaucracy to enforce laws, I argue that one cannot rely only on the existence
of a bureaucracy in transitional societies, where by definition state structures are
weak. Hence, there is a need for participation to alleviate legitimacy and
implementation.
11.
For the purpose of this paper, I define “elites” as political actors,
including members of parliament, senior government officials, and also legal
professionals, the latter essentially constituting a lawmaking group. Regarding
the role of lawyers as an elite group, see William Ewald, The Logic of Legal
Transplants, 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 4, 489, 499 (1995) (Ewald writes that lawyers
constitute an elite lawmaking group).
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society calls for clear, transparent, and predictable rules, a certain
formalism in the societal interrelations. On the other hand, the fluid
nature of transition demands solutions outside the legal framework.
In this context, it is necessary to note that there is more to the
effectiveness and legitimacy of a normative order than technical
considerations dictated by experts. The legitimacy of law, where
legitimacy means acceptance as the basis of social coordination,
requires a social and political foundation.12 This raises the need to
ensure a democratic and participatory process of lawmaking,
which is able to give legitimacy to adopted laws, and prevent
lawmaking within closed door chambers.
In this paper, I draw from the experiences that I had while I
was working on legislative policies at the Albanian Ministry of
Justice. I also draw upon a more modest experience in Nepal where
I was drafting a key piece of the legal framework on microfinance.
What makes studying the Albanian legislative process interesting
and relevant to the contemporary processes of state building,
democratization and development is the degree and complexity of
experiments done and still being done today in reforming the
political landscape, economy, society and the legal system. In that
milieu are embedded all versions of Frankenberg‟s comparative
lawyer, as well as successive mutations of comparative law in

12.
See Scott Newton, Transplantation And Transition: Legality And
Legitimacy In The Kazakhstani Legislative Process, in LAW AND INFORMAL
PRACTICES, THE POST COMMUNIST EXPERIENCE 151 (Denis J. Galligan &
Marina Kurkchiyan eds., 2003). Newton argues that foundation can be based on
interaction and reciprocity. For other accounts of legitimacy in legal reforms see
generally Samuel J. M. Donnelly, Reflecting on the Rule of Law: Its Reciprocal
Relation with Rights, Legitimacy, and Other Concepts and Institutions, 603
ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES,
LAW, SOCIETY AND DEMOCRACY: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 37, at 44
(2006). Donnelly writes that changes or developments in law or legal institutions
can enhance the legitimacy power of the courts or society or they can produce
legitimacy costs. Legitimacy power can accumulate slowly during a sequence of
law reform or over the history of an institution. Thomas Franck writes,
“legitimacy is the quality of a rule, or a system of rules, or a process for making
or interpreting rules that pulls both the rule makers and those addressed by the
rules toward voluntary compliance. Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to
Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 46, 50 (1992). Duncan Kennedy
also provides a series of contexts in which emerges the concept of “legitimacy
power.” Duncan Kennedy, Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication, A Critical
Phenomenology, 36 J. OF LEGAL EDUC. 518 (1986).
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action.13 Those in turn, are associated with differing political wills
and legacies of the multitude of domestic and international actors.
The first Chapter looks at the practices and requirements of the
lawmaking process, thus illustrating the dynamic of the early years
of transition, which are common to all transitioning countries. It
provides a narrative of the political transformation process and
discusses the rise of the informal sector. I also map key actors of
legal reforms. Taking into consideration the horizontalization of
lawmaking, the role of various institutions and exogenous actors
that participate in reforming the system is analyzed against the
dichotomy of informal and formal norms inherent in a transition
process.
The second Chapter probes the relationship between the
legality and the legitimacy of the lawmaking process. In discussing
the lawmaking methodologies, I analyze this relationship vis-à-vis
the legitimacy derived from a democratic law making process. The
methodologies of reforming the legislation reflect the background
and assumptions of the actors involved.14 In this context, as Ajani
puts it, one could speak in terms of an offer and demand of
legislation.15 This approach highlights the effect of the diversity of
origins of laws introduced to the legal system.
The lawmaking practices raise more questions than answers
vis-à-vis the compatibility, adaptability and functioning of
legislation originated from different legal systems, the enforcement
of standards and norms in local communities, and the compliance
with requirements of public participation. They also open the
Pandora box regarding the implications of adopting international
standards, and the role of international organizations as providers
13.
Günter Frankenberg, Stranger than Paradise: identity and Politics
in Comparative Law, 2 UTAH L. REV. 259 (1997) (Frankenberg discusses
interchangeably the identities of comparative lawyers when advising a foreign
government. The case in question is based from a business trip to the Albanian
Ministry of Justice).
14.
For instance, international organizations and foreign donors‟
projects were aimed at incorporating international standards as well as relying
heavily upon harmonizing laws with existing standards by mostly transplanting
legislation of developed countries, but not only. When OSCE was advising
Albania to revise its Election Code, legal sources as far dispersed as those from
the former Zaire to Azerbaijan were presented as examples. I had just started
working at that time, in the summer of 2000, and the materials were on my own
desk.
15.
Ajani, supra note 7, at 97.
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of expertise and norms. One of the problems associated with legal
reforms projects is the emphasis on the technical rather than
political or social nature of expertise.16 While this approach allows
legal work to be carried out even in those areas considered
inherently political with the justification that it could increase the
legitimacy of the outcome through prestige, more often then not
the result is the contrary. The recipients of laws often stay outside
the political and lawmaking process, which in turn is conditioned
by the central influences of domestic elites and international
factors.
The methodology of preparing laws, within the technical
assistance framework provided by international actors has changed
twice in the last 20 years. In the early 1990s until 2002, weak state
structures exacerbated the lack of coordination among various
actors involved in the reformation of laws. The preferred approach
of preparing laws consisted of the establishment of closed working
groups, no more than three to four experts each, working on a
particular law. As mentioned earlier, during this time, a legion of
legal reform projects in similar areas, sometimes even working on
the same legislative measure, but from different perspectives
created a plethora of results. No one has dared, or dares, to embark
on a study of evaluating the effects and results of those laws.17 The
myriad of legal reform projects combined with the diversity of
experts, bringing their own backgrounds in drafting law, resulted
in conflicts in the codification efforts of the late 1990s.18
16.
David Kennedy makes a general case on the need to bring politics in
expertise and comparative law. See generally David Kennedy, Challenging
Expert Rule: The Politics of Global Governance, 27 SYDNEY J. OF INT‟L L. 5
(2005), and The Methods and Politics of Comparative Law, in THE COMMON
CORE OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW: ESSAYS ON THE PROJECT 131 (Mauro
Bussani & Ugo Mattei eds., Kluwer Law International 2003).
17.
There are no studies indicating the implementation or the extent of
harmonization of particular pieces of legislation with international standards
broadly defined. However, there are reports on the progress of Southeast
European countries toward membership or association with the European Union,
which contain passages on the status of different sectors related to the internal
market, as well as project implementation reports from the World Bank and
country reports in the WTO.
18.
For instance, the Albanian civil code was drafted within the
framework of a Council of Europe (CoE) and was adopted relatively quickly by
the Parliament in 1994, partly because the elements of the market economy
needed some legal basis. At the same time, two other projects from the German
Technical Assistance (GTZ), were working on the commercial legislation and
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The modern era of legal reform is mostly devoted to the
approximation of legislation with the European Union (EU)
acquis.19 The challenge here, since the EU legislation formally
does not have direct effect on candidate or associated countries, is
to transpose the standards laid down by the EU Treaties,
regulations and directives into domestic laws.20 The methodology
adopted by the Executive branch is to create working groups with
experts from interested line ministries that often fall back in the
default mode of transposition of their predecessors of the early
1990s.
The proliferation of law, or as I call it “the inflation of
legislation,” aimed at filling the gaps between the law in the book
and the law in action is in fact only exacerbating the contradictions
in the legal system, and simultaneously highlighting the defective
nature of the lawmaking process. The implementation of
legislation has encountered two barriers that derive their nature
from the legislative process. First, there is little understanding in
the administration about the EU standards and how to transpose
them into the domestic system. This is followed by a poor
performance in enforcing laws. The desire for a closer integration
with the international, or for greater Europeanization, has provided
a powerful incentive to adopt more laws than it is possible to
absorb and enforce. Any piece of legislation with a European
Union label is fast tracked to the Parliament.21 The problem with

competition, with German experts. The result was that after completing the
legislation and after the Parliament adopted it, the experts from both projects
saw that with respect to consumer protection and commercial registry, these two
pieces of legislation had conflicting provisions and solutions.
19.
The body of European Union regulations and standards of primary
and secondary legislation, as well as European Court of Justice jurisprudence,
case law. By modern era, I mean the results of approximation that started in
2000.
20.
The choice of the legal median is left to the enforcing country, and
it can either be a law, almost always initiated by the executive branch and voted
by the parliament in the so called fast track procedure, or executive orders-by
laws. Within ten years, or sooner, any country associated with the EU, and
aspiring for membership, has to incorporate approximately 100,000 pages of
acquis, the number keeps growing each year.
21.
The fast track procedure is widely used in Central and Eastern
European parliaments, and as a matter of fact, it is adopted solely for the
purpose of adopting laws required under the relationship with the EU.
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this is not the existence of just weak administrative capacities, but
with the approach taken to the harmonization of legislation.
Second, as the institution responsible for enforcing such
contradictory and incoherent laws, the judiciary is the ultimate
bearer of inadequacies of the legislative process. Among many
complaints from judges is their relative ignorance of the laws, and
the inability to understand, interpret and enforce legislation. This
trend is a result of their absolute absence from the lawmaking
process.
The third Chapter puts forward some proposals to ameliorate
the lawmaking process by introducing several ways of assessing
and evaluating legislation. Almost every report from the
international community on Albania emphasizes the failure to
enforce laws. This problem is often attributed to inadequate
capacities or political will. Instead, it should serve as a cause for
inquiring about the coherence of the legal reform programs. The
fact that despite 20 years of transition Albania is still in transition
facing the same type of problems indicates that questioning the
human and institutional capital does not fully address the issue. It
is feasible to assume that in 20 years people would have had the
time to train and learn, even by a trial and error method.
Concluding, this paper elucidates the complexity of lawmaking
in a transitioning process and exposes conflicting aspects of the
legal reform, which tend to favor legality over legitimacy. The
implication, ultimately, is the perpetuation of transition and the
withering away of the legitimacy of democratic regimes.
III. CHAPTER ONE: TWENTY YEARS OF TRANSITION:
POLITICS AND ACTORS
In this Chapter, I lay the context to my argument that attempts
to reform legislation during periods of transition are inherently
unable to reflect the complex and ever shifting social forces that
regulate relationships in a society. This inherent inability in turn
emphasizes the tension in the relationship between the legality of
normative measures and the legitimacy of solutions, which
undermines the credibility of law as an instrument of change. I
provide a narrative of the transition process in Albania during the
1990s, focusing on two aspects, first, highlighting the chaotic
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nature of the process and the erosion of the state associated with
the rise of informality, and second, the actors that largely drive the
transformation process. The choice of Albania is not simply based
on knowledge of the country, but rather one based on the merits of
the case. The experience of the legal reform in Albania is in itself a
study in complexity. It includes phenomena common to most of
the other former socialist countries, and in some aspects it outpaces
them in its extremity and severity. It is illustrative of a country that
experienced a period of modernization through industrialization
and urbanization between 1924-1989. In turn, from 1991 until
present day, it is systematically and structurally deindustrialized,
with one fourth of the population leaving to go overseas.
Furthermore, it is illustrative of a country where democratization
after Huntingtonian‟s third wave model is being reinjected.22
A. Politics of Transition and Transformation
It becomes therefore necessary to say a few words about the
forces and phenomena that shape the context in which we find the
seeds of legal reform programs as instruments of change. The
transition from a communist country towards a liberal democracy
in the early 1990s relied heavily on law. Hart has argued that the
need for certainty about rules points to the need for a legal
system.23 This central and formal understanding of law was
22.
In this latter context, the country experienced a brief period of
democratization in mid 1920s until 1939. After 1947, with the consolidation of
the Communist Party‟s grasp of power, the totalitarian ideology permeated
every particle of the society, economy and politics, thus treating these three
components as one. The transition process taking place since 1991 is structurally
transforming the society, economy and politics, treating each one of these
components individually. However, I use the term “reinjected” not only to
denote the above-mentioned cycle, but also to the fluctuations between
democracy and quasi-authoritorianism that characterized the political landscape
between 1991-2010. Respectively, 1991-1995 and 2001-1007 were the most
democratic periods, whereas 1995-2001 and 2007-2010 were periods where
quasi-authoritarianism was on the rise.
23.
H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (2d ed., Oxford University
Press 1994). On the extent of the role of law in social change, see generally a
summary of legal reform projects published by the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development, Law in Transition: Ten Years of Legal
Transition
(Autumn,
2002),
available
at
http://www.ebrd.com/downloads/legal/secured/lit022.pdf (last visited April 21,
2011).
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considered as the necessary vehicle to achieve society‟s goals and
inspirations. The centrality and omnipresence of law takes a
totalitarian dimension when considering the attempts to refer to
law and to formalize almost every aspect of life, or as David
Kennedy says “there is law at every turn.”24 Even the political
rhetoric embraced concepts such as “respect for law,” and “rule of
law, often ascribing to it a legitimizing function.”25 However, few
actually understand the meaning of rule of law or agree on its
implications. Indeed, the formalization of law, or for better words,
the drive towards formalism, is pervasive and utterly imported.
Within each society law is embedded differently in the social
texture, varying in its form, substance, social functions, regulative
impact and in its legislative procedures.26 While the content and
consequences of a law could be judged separately from the process
by which it is made, I argue that the process itself has an influence
on the attitudes and on the acceptance of law. Needless to say, an
open law-making process enables the law to positively deal with
major social issues, inform the interested communities about the
envisioned goals, objectives and procedures, and adjust the role of
the implementing institutions.
In a totalitarian state, law has a subservient position to the party
guidelines.27 It thus takes an instrumental role in the Party‟s
interests. For instance, in Albania the functioning of the secret
police was not regulated by a legal framework, and its absence did
not prevent the secret police from enforcing laws, or the “party‟s
line.” On the other hand, there was an extreme attempt at
legalizing, or formalizing, other aspects of life. As the communist
system matured, so it formalized the relationship of the individual
to the state, extending to the utmost details of life in the gulags.
The more the socialist state matured, the more laws it adopted. The
24.
David Kennedy, Challenging Expert Rule: The Politics of Global
Governance 27 SYDNEY J. OF INT‟LL L. 5, 1 (2005).
25.
It is worth mentioning that there is no translation of the “rule of
law” into the Albanian language. The substituted version, which supposedly
means rule of law in the local context is indeed “shtet ligjor,” “Rechtsstaat,” “a
legal state.”
26.
Marina Kurkchiyan, The Illegitimacy of Law in Post-Soviet
Societies, in LAW AND INFORMAL PRACTICES, THE POST COMMUNIST
EXPERIENCE 25, 31 (Denis J. Galligan & Marina Kurkchiyan eds., 2003).
27.
The slogan was, “What the people say the party does, and what the
party say, people do.”
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establishment of “the rule of law society,” or Rechsstaat, is
portrayed to correspond with the victory of rules against
informalism. However, the exact definition of the rule of law in
countries in transition is ambiguous. It constantly shifts according
to the exclusive function of what an organization needs to do to
justify legal reforms projects. In assessing the rule of law programs
sponsored by the World Bank, Alvaro Santos tracks the variations
of the concept of rule of law in legal reform programs according to
institutional and substantive, instrumental and intrinsic criteria of
classification.28
The abrupt decentralization of governmental powers, along
with the reduction in competencies and size of the central and local
governments, resulting from neoliberal prescriptions on the role of
government as a watchdog, contributed to a gap between law in the
books and law in action. What followed after the collapse of the
ancien régime was a move from a highly centralized state towards
a mutation of the government‟s role in the society following the
laissez faire doctrine.”29 Law became the epicenter and the rule of
law rhetoric became the slogan of the day. Regardless of the size
of government, and in the early 1990s the size of the public sector
decreased steadily, the number of laws increased on a daily basis.
This process transformed law into a product. Today, for instance,
the number of laws produced by any Ministry is the measure of
effectiveness for that institution, a measure of productivity and
efficacy, a symbol of its success. It determines the fate of one‟s
career and furthermore, it determines the understanding of law and
its relation to the society. Experts and institutions are seen as
factors of production; law is therefore commodified.
The economic component of transition is outliving its
contemporaries elsewhere. It has achieved the goal of
fundamentally restructuring
the
economy
by
utterly
deindustrializing it. This form of restructuring has allowed only for
28.
Alvaro Santos, The World Bank's Uses of the "Rule of Law"
Promise in Economic Development, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 253 (Cambridge University Press 2006).
29.
The approach of shock therapies can be conceptualized as a
fluctuation between “seizing the window of opportunity” and therefore relying
on discretion and standards to achieve the ends of a liberal democratic society
with a functioning market economy, and the return to institutions, understood as
rules of the games, as a precondition for the functioning of the market.
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the emergence of trafficking of human beings and drugs, as well as
the remittance of migrant workers. It has systematically
encouraged immigration by effectively turning it into the single
biggest input of the GDP, and it has eroded any trust in the
legitimacy of the system.
The lack of trust in the legal system results in a surge towards
the informal, which being more efficient, contributes to the decline
of the trust in the system.30 In the context of customary law, or
informal normative aspects of the society and formal rules,
Sigismund Diamond writes that “[c]ustom is the modality of
primitive society; law is the instrument of civilization, of political
society sanctioned by organized force, presumably above society at
large, and buttressing a new set of social interests,” or as Sir Henry
Maine has famously conceptualized the development of law and
society as moving from status to contract.31
“Social norms are relevant to legal failure,” writes Galligan, in
the first place they tend to undermine the function of law as a
distinct means of social regulations.32 They do so by undermining
or diminishing the special qualities law needs in order to be
effective.33 If law is not seen as important in serving social needs,
the conditions for its being able to develop in order to do so are
likely to be missing. Another way social norms are relevant to
legal failure is when their content conflicts with the law. In the
case of Albania, social norms associated with the ancien régime
quickly became taboo, and instead the society turned towards the
formal and informal law for guidance. What took place can be
described as a competition of forces in the vacuum resulting from a
30.
A perfect example of the informalism in the economy and the
silence of the legal system is the phenomenon regarding the financial “pyramid”
schemes of 1995-‟97. Promoted by every single international organization with
a presence in the country as a success story among Central and Eastern
European countries, “a poster child,” the Albanian government encouraged the
system of informal money lending. The epilogue of this two year-old process
consisted of the presence of a stabilization police mission of the European
Community in Albania in order to restore public order after the collapse of the
“pyramids.”
31.
Sigismund Diamond, The Rule of Law versus the Order of Custom,
38 SOC. RES. 42 (1971); SIR HENRY MAINE, ANCIENT LAW (1861).
32.
Denis J. Galligan, Legal Failure in Post-Communist Europe, in
LAW AND INFORMAL PRACTICES, THE POST COMMUNIST EXPERIENCE 1, 4 (Denis
J. Galligan & Marina Kurkchiyan eds., 2003).
33.
Id.
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lack of social norms to operate in a free society on the one hand,
and the lack of the enforcement of laws on the other.
During the last twenty years, there is a parallel development of
social norms and legal formalism. The former is a product of
peripheries: people cut off from the chores of running a state. The
latter is a newborn, a transplant, a product of the center, the
nation‟s capital, where the domestic cooperates successfully with
the international. The surge of formalism as the way of
understanding law came from the center, from adopting policies
related to the necessities of the market, that is to say the demand
for clear, precise, and systemic laws that are supposed to guarantee
the functioning of the market and to attract foreign investments.
The change in the understanding of development results in the
change of rhetoric on the meaning of rule of law. Whereas
Washington consensus policies ascribed an instrumental function
to the law in eradicating the past and providing for the future,
relying both on formal and informal norms, the new development
strategy of the mid to late 1990s based on good governance,
foregrounds the law.34 This latter approach treats law not only as
an instrument of change, but as the goal of transformation, heavily
vested with formal characteristics.
A similarity between these two strategies is in the technical
nature of the legal reform. The first focuses on questions of
efficiency, whereas the second on questions of good governance,
rather than on questions of distribution or government. The
elimination of the political and therefore of the role of ideology in
the functioning of the market and good governance, is done in the
name of expertise and technicality that sees win-win situations.
However, it is a hard sell to maintain that law is merely technical
in nature, and there is no reason to assume that they will be
effective on their own.35 Reforming legislation is ultimately a
34.
See David Kennedy, The New Law and Economic Development, in
THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 95 (David Trubek & Alvaro
Santos eds., Cambridge University Press 2006).
35.
In an article on the role of law in political transformation, Ruti
Teitel argues that the previous politicized nature of law and adjudication
partially justifies non-adherence during the transition. This understanding of the
rule of law as anti-politics is a common theme. Ruti Teitel, Transitional
Jurisprudence: The Role of Law in Political Transformation, 106 YALE L. J. 7,
2009, 2030 (1997).
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political objective that needs a political coalition in place to
support it, and public acceptance to enforce it.
The two paradigms of development transcend political
divisions. In three consequent periods 1992-1997, 1998-2005, and
2005-2009, governments from both ends of the political spectrum
have adopted the above-mentioned strategies. During the first
period informality went to the extreme.36 Informal economy, and
informal relations in the public administration. The late
governments of 1997-2009, under the new paradigm of governance
as development have taken steps at formalizing the economy and
public administration. However, it does not mean those efforts
have made any impact on the relationship of the individual as a
political animal to the government and power. While in the
socialist regimes it was accepted that the will of the individual was
subsumed to the will of the collective, the new democratic regime
has yet to provide the emancipation of the individual for which the
socialist regime was changed.37 In the new system, the individual
has become unhinged and there is a total sense of alienation from
the society and a strong move towards familial amoralism.
This narrative on the complexities of transition from a
communist legal regime towards a liberal democratic legal order
highlights the dilemmas and challenges that a government faces
when at the same time it attempts to behave both pragmatically and
visionary, legally and politically, in order to control the chaos and
direct the transformation.
The fluidity of the relationship between law and politics, or
legality and legitimacy, is well illustrated by the phenomenon of
political round tables. Whenever there is a political crisis,
regardless of the nature and motives, usually the party in power
would posit itself as the defender of the legality of some normative
act, or institution, such as preferably the Constitution or the courts.
The challenger, in its attempts to shake the legitimacy of the
system, would demand a solution outside the regular institutional
36.
The 1997 financial crisis was attributed to the collapse of the
“pyramid schemes.”
37.
On the political transformation and the role of values see generally
Teitel, supra note 35, at 2026 (Teitel holds that no one rule of law value is
essential in the movement toward construction of a more liberal political
system).
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channels. In a situation like this, the role of the international
community is virtually or realistically emphasized by both parties.
Never allowing a good crisis to be wasted, the international actors
would strive to find followers in need of patronage. This latter
game is carefully played out, without giving direct messages, but
rather subtly hinting and confounding the local actors with
ambiguous messages. The Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe, OSCE, has become the default player,
accumulating legitimacy for itself and also giving legitimacy to its
solutions. On the one hand, international actors are involved head
over heels in promoting an institutional and formal legal culture,
the rule of law society, and on the other hand, the adventurism and
quest for solutions outside the institutional framework is rewarded
as an adequate response to the difficult nature of transition.
The relevant point here is not about the fact that the Albanian
parties disregard the requirements of the rule of law, after all the
political rhetoric emphasizes that they are not fully matured
democratic actors. Instead, it is the blessing of the international
community for orchestrating solutions outside the box.38 In these
situations, the line between political solutions and respect for the
rule of law is extremely thin, reflecting an ever present dichotomy
of “engagement with local leaders, in other words the informal,
and the promotion of respect for the rule of law.39
The axiom that law should be recognized as having an
important part in social organization is questioned by the primary
actors who adopt it. Savigny‟s writes that “[l]aw is only law where
it maintains a close relationship with the common consciousness of
the people,” the key element in the creation of public confidence in
the legal system is the belief that rules agreed to in a democratic
manner are followed by the entire society and by state structures.40
The rise in the authority of international factors, throughout
twenty years of transition, as the ultimate arbiter and source of
legitimacy in determining constitutional solutions outside the
38.
There are several explanations for the failure of law, ranging from
weak democratic principles to old mentality from the socialist past.
39.
This latter point is illustrated by the engagement of international
actors with locals in the political crisis of 1997.
40.
FRIEDERICH VON SAVIGNY, SYSTEM OF THE MODERN ROMAN LAW
(Madras: J. Higginbotham 1867).
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institutional framework, as well as in the top-down approach to
disregarding legal formulas, has created the belief of politics über
alles. It is not clear how this situation fits with the description and
final analyses of legal reform projects and workshops that train
politicians to think in legal terms. It is not altogether uncommon
for the same actors to be encouraged to find solutions outside the
system, and the next day to participate in training on the absolute
authority of institutions and the rule of law. This latter concept is
seriously pursued in transforming the local culture by sowing the
concept of law as incubated from the everyday, able to function
within the limits that insulate judges and decision makers from
outside influences.
The discussion of political culture extends more specifically
into the question of access to the legislative process. Whenever
people are not effectively consulted in the development of law, and
have little reason to view institutions as legitimate, they do not
own the law. Consequently, they perceive little obligation to obey
it, their decisions on compliance resting on an assessment of the
coercive power of the state.41 In this case the only way to succeed
in making laws work is to enforce them with impunity.42
The characteristics of the modern state emphasize the
rationality of law and the need for adopting legislative procedures–
in particular to contend with inflationary tendencies in legislative
production—so as to guarantee the quality of legislation and
implement its results. The application of law sometimes takes
tyrannical features, reflecting a Weberian sense of the drive
towards bureaucratizing any aspect of life in an organized
society.43 The indispensability of acting according to the legal
41.

Neil MacFarlane, Politics and the Rule of Law in the CIS, in LAW
61, 74 (Denis J.
Galligan & Marina Kurkchiyan eds., 2003).
42.
This leads to an interesting comparison of the intensity of
enforcement of laws and deeply rooted social norms. The Northern part of
Albania functioned under the norms of the Kanun of Leka, a 500 year-old
formalized customary law, that even existed during the Ottoman occupation, and
regulated most aspects of family, civil and penal law. The communist
government enforced with an unprecedented impunity its laws, and especially in
the Northern part, and with great success. However, as soon as communism fell,
the norms of the Kanun resurfaced almost immediately.
43.
MAX WEBER'S ECONOMY AND SOCIETY (Charles Camic et al. eds.,
Stanford University Press 2005).
AND INFORMAL PRACTICES, THE POST COMMUNIST EXPERIENCE
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process is attributed to the strengthening of the rule of law vis-à-vis
ordinary people, and disregarding its relation to the political class.
In this context, law can demand absolute fanaticism to the
formality of say issuance of birth certificates, where it can be
scrupulously implemented. From the perspective of a political
party, a formal approach to law can threaten the fragile democratic
nature of the state, and thus any attempts at reinforcing legality are
swiftly denounced as authoritarian actions by the state.
In authoritarian regimes the legislative process by definition is
hermetic. Whereas, the systemic changes of the 1990s attempted to
constitute a clean break regarding the substance of legislation, we
cannot say the same for the lawmaking process.44 This is not to say
that I am overlooking the significance of the content of new rules
creating new rights and obligations. After all Hart said that “. . .
some of the distinctive features of a legal system lie in the
provisions it makes . . . ,” however my interests in the procedure
are closely connected to the outcome. In this context there is a
relationship between the domestic and international factors that
dominate the process.
B. Actors of the Lawmaking Process
In this section, I narrate briefly a panorama of the main actors
and their activities involved in legal reform in Albania. I map some
the most influential actors, without necessarily attempting to
comprehensively and exhaustively covering who‟s who or who‟s
doing what. In this context, I provide a typology of some of the
most influential actors involved in lawmaking.45 There are two
broad categories that could be used to characterize the actors
involved in lawmaking. That is to say I group them according to
their origin. In this sense, there are international and domestic
actors. Each has its own sub-division between state and non-state
actors.
The international actors involved in legal reform programs in
Albania can be divided in two groups. The first consists of
international organizations, most notably, the European Union
44.
Hart, supra note 23.
45.
Influence in this context is related to the perceived power that is
exercised by the said actors.
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(EU), Council of Europe (CoE), and World Bank (WB). The
second group consists of donor countries acting through their own
governmental and non-governmental organizations, most notably
the German Technical Assistance (GTZ), United States Agency for
International Development (USAID), and Central and Eastern
European Legal Initiative (CEELI). All of these groups work with
the local government and non-state actors in conceptualizing and
implementing legal reform programs.
The European Community established contractual relations
with Albania in 1992 with a Trade and Co-operation Agreement
that promoted trade on the basis of non-discrimination and
reciprocity. This agreement did contain a provision on the
approximation of legislation in the areas of the internal market, but
it lacked an institutional approach for large-scale legal reform.
However, the “great leap forward” in the EU-Albania relations
took place with the launch of the Stabilization and Association
Process (SAP) for the Western Balkans in 1999.46 It was aimed at
assisting the Southeast European countries to undergo a political
and economic transition that prepared them for a new form of
contractual relationship with the EU known as stabilization and
association agreements. The Stabilization and Association
Agreements (SAA) combine political and economic conditions,
such as respect for democratic principles, reform of the judiciary,
and strengthening links of the countries of the region with the EC
single market. They foresee the establishment of a free trade area
with the EC and set out rights and obligations in areas such as
competition and state aid rules, intellectual property and
establishment, which are supposed to allow the economies of the
region to integrate with that of the EU.47 The Stabilization and
Association Agreements contain provisions for the approximation
of domestic legislation with the EU acquis in two stages during a
10 year period.

46.
As a framework, SAP combined various instruments, an assistance
program (CARDS), technical advice, trade preferences, co-operation in fields
such as justice and home affairs, and political dialogue.
47.
See The Stabilization and Association Process, available at:
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/enlargement_process/accession_process/how_d
oes_a_country_join_the_eu/index_en.htm (last visited April 21, 2011).
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Each year, a national plan for the approximation with the
acquis specifies the legal areas and measures that are to be
harmonized with the EU standards.48 It is the largest and most
influential package of reformatory instruments adopted each year
as part of the EU conditionality for candidate for membership
countries. The first areas that are targeted include competition law,
intellectual property law, standards and certification law, public
procurement law and data protection law. Legal approximation in
other sectors of the internal market is an obligation to be met at the
end of the transition period. During the second stage of the
transitional period the approximation of laws will extend to the
elements of the acquis that are not covered in the first stage.49
During the negotiation period, a Consultative Task Force
(CTF) of the European Commission and Albanian government
examines the progress of legislation. Every six weeks the
Executive is obliged to submit a progress report to the Commission
on the status of legislative and institutional measures identified
during the CTF, negotiations and in the European Partnership
document. In addition to this, the launch of the TAIEX assistance
for the approximation of legislation, monitors changes in
legislation on a monthly basis.50
The Council of Europe is an example of an intergovernmental
organization where the Member States, at least conceptually, have
greater influence in determining the influence of CoE in their own
domestic legal reform projects. However, this is not the case with
the former socialist countries. Legal reform programs have been on
48.
Otherwise referred to as simply NPAA, containing annual
legislative and institutional measures to be adopted with a year in order to
implement Community legislation and raising administrative capacities to
enforce them.
49.
Excerpts from the draft European Community and Member States
Stabilization and Association Agreement with Albania (unpublished material)
(2004).
50.
TAIEX is the Technical Assistance and Information Exchange
Instrument of the Institution Building unit of Directorate-General Enlargement
of the European Commission. Its aim is to provide to the New Member States,
acceding countries, candidate countries, and the administrations of the Western
Balkans, short-term technical assistance, in line with the overall policy
objectives of the European Commission, and in the field of approximation,
application and enforcement of EU legislation. Assistance is also provided to
those countries included in the EU's European Neighborhood Policy, as well as
Russia.
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the agenda of the Council of Europe since the beginning of the
„90s.51 Its assistance has focused on drafting legislation in civil and
criminal areas, consistent with CoE conventions and treaties. In
particular, legal instruments such as the civil code, the
Constitution, an anti-corruption package, and special legislation in
the criminal area have all been prepared with CoE expertise.52 It
has been a working practice and understanding between Albania
and CoE, that the Ministry of Justice, or the Constitutional Court
would submit major draft laws53 to CoE‟s Legal Affairs
Department for opinion and expertise, or ask for opinio juris. In
this context, there was a silent agreement between CoE and the
Executive branch that in their relations with the Parliament, or the
public, a draft law would be considered prepared with CoE
expertise as long as it was submitted to it, without CoE necessarily
issuing an opinion. Labeling a particular law with CoE brand
strengthens the legitimacy of actors and silences political conflicts.
The World Bank has been involved in four different ways in
legal reform programs. It has traditionally characterized
governance as neutral and technical in character, thus paving the
way for reforming the legal systems of host countries.54 The Bank
has contributed to the development of legislation in the areas of
51.
The CoE has focused on the process of lawmaking as well. One of
its projects was to support member states‟ administrations in their efforts to
improve the quality of law making. The project‟s activities aimed at promoting
application of a uniform law-drafting technique and style and identify and
disseminate best practice concerning the management of the preparation,
discussion, adoption and publication of legislation. Its major themes included
transparency of the legislative process where the project‟s activities promote
more active consultation of external interested organizations and civil society
representatives on draft laws and regulations. Broad consultation was also one of
the principal tools to enable evaluation of the impact of legislation, which is
another important activity of the project aiming at improving the stability of
legislation. The project dealt with issues concerning better access to legislation,
including the functioning of the official gazettes and design of electronic legal
databases.
52.
Data from the
Council of Europe, available at:
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ListeTraites.asp?CM=3&MA=999&
PO=ALB&SI=2&CL=ENG (last visited April 21, 2011).
53.
Usually these are draft laws dealing explicitly with political ends.
This practice is of importance to the executive but also to other political forces
because it can rubber stamp approval or disagreement to their initiatives thus
eliminating most of the contested domestic debate.
54.
WORLD BANK, GOVERNANCE: THE WORLD BANK‟S EXPERIENCE
(1994).
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public procurement, property registration and property law,
bankruptcy, collateral laws and laws on the structure of the
judiciary. Its Legal and Judicial Reform Project of 2000 reflected a
new development paradigm that treats good governance and rule of
law as a development strategy. Despite millions of dollars spent
mostly on foreign expertise, the results of World Bank‟s
engagement in legal reform have been disappointing. One of the
components, the improvement of the legal education at the Law
School of the University of Tirana has not given any particular
results.55 The legal education in the country is by all domestic and
international comparisons anemic, to say the least. A project to
rehabilitate the school actually left the school in shambles. In an
act of triumph of hope versus the experience, the Bank spent
considerable funds in futile attempts to build an arbitration center
in Tirana, a country where it is fairly easy to bribe any judge,
despite numerous ethical and criminal provisions prohibiting it. To
this day, after at least six years of existence, the center has still to
be used.56 The transition process fuels distrust in government and
authorities. In this case, how the World Bank tried to bridge the
distance remains a puzzle. In this context, what is there to prevent
anyone from corrupting any arbitrator, when there are no
regulations against the conflict of interests or subjecting arbitrators
to the jurisdiction of the penal code? Fast tracking the adoption of
ethical codes for arbitrators won‟t solve the deeply entrenched lack
of trust towards any institutions. Furthermore, a stakeholder
approach adopted by the World Bank to encourage local
authorities to participate in formulating and implementing its
recommendations did not make any difference in the process of

55.
This particular component aimed at funding twinning arrangements
to train faculty staff abroad and technical assistance; strengthening the
institutional capacity of the Law School and funding textbook preparation and
teaching materials, financing investments, and rehabilitating and expanding the
premises of the law faculty building.
56.
World Bank, Legal and Judicial Reform in Europe and Central Asia
(202),
available
at
http://web.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=301446&pagePK=14
1143&piPK=399272&theSitePK=301412 (last visited April 21, 2011).
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adopting national strategies.57 The process is as hermetic as it ever
was.58
The second group that has contributed considerably to legal
reform programs consists mainly of government sponsored
organizations, such as the GTZ,59 USAID,60 and CEELI.61 The
context for their involvement is the international aid allocated by
donor countries, and channeled through them either in the form of
direct grants, but mainly in the form of technical assistance.
Benefiting from their own expertise and financial resources at
hand, they become influential sources of power and legitimation
for the host government and local actors. As it will be discussed
later in the paper, reliance on dogmatic premises, such as the
USAID‟s paradigm of creating legal systems that better support
democratic practices, or twin competition and rivalries among
57.
See
World
Bank
Projects
and
Programs,
http://www.worldbank.org.al (last visited April 21, 2011). The Strategy went by
the name of National Strategy for Economic and Social Development.
58.
I was in charge of conceptualizing legislative policies at the
Ministry of Justice and despite my position, neither my colleagues nor I was
ever involved in the World Bank legal reform projects.
59.
GTZ in Albania, http://www.gtz.de/en/weltweit/europa-kaukasuszentralasien/648.htm (last visited April 21, 2011). The bilateral cooperation
between GTZ and Albania began in 1988, even before the Communist era had
ended, and it focused mainly on the economic sector. In this framework the legal
expertise of the GTZ has been influential to the development of the Albanian
commercial legislation and registry of companies, civil procedure, insolvency
law, and recently of the competition and consumer protection laws.
60.
USAID in Albania, Rule of Law, http://albania.usaid.gov (last
visited April 21, 2011). Its programs aimed at improving the professional and
ethical performance of the judiciary and judicial institutions, promoting anticorruption and avoidance of conflicts of interests, land titles, mobilizing citizens
to demand accountability and transparency from the government, promoting
public awareness and education, domestic violence and the new family code.
61.
CEELI
activities
in
Albania,
http://apps.americanbar.org/rol/europe_and_eurasia/albania.html (last visited
April 21, 2011). The Central and Eastern European Legal Initiative (CEELI)
was active in Albania right after the collapse of the regime in 1992. It supported
Eastern European countries and not it is focusing on Central Asia. Since
commencing its program CEELI's major projects have included: substantial
assistance in support of the drafting of a new, democratic constitution, adopted
through a popular referendum in 1998; promotion of judicial independence by
supporting the creation of the Albanian Magistrates School and facilitating the
establishment of the National Judicial Conference; and substantial support of
legal profession reform and legal education by providing expertise and
assistance to the National Chamber of Advocates. From 1998 to 2001, CEELI
conducted a Criminal Law Reform Program, and from 2002 it worked in the
anti-corruption campaign.
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organizations can serve as illuminating lessons for modern day
lawmaking and democratization.62
The domestic actors can be divided in governmental actors, in
particular the Parliament and Ministries, and a potpourri of sub
national non-state actors. The latter are often created and
maintained through family ties to the government, or through
alliances. Based on that connection, a rotation of fortunes for these
organizations takes place whenever the right or the left come to
power. Formally, Article 81§1 of the Constitution gives the right to
initiate laws to the Council of Ministers, members of parliament,
and 20,000 voters.63 An interesting shift in legislative powers can
be traced to the rise of the Executive branch as the predominant
actor in lawmaking. Approximately 99% of all legislation
approved by the Parliament is initiated by the Council of
Ministers.64 Article 26 of the law “On the Organization and
Functioning of the Council of Ministers” recognizes the right of
legislative initiatives only for ministries and their dependent
agencies. Every ministry proposes legal acts in accordance with the
area of competencies and with the activities of the dependent
agencies and central institutions. Among the ministries, the most
influential is the Ministry of Justice, which not only has the right to
initiate laws, but most importantly is the gatekeeper for the
compatibility of laws.
The Ministry of Justice, reestablished in 1990 after three
decades of inexistence in the socialist regime, where the
presumption was that the state and the party were always right
hence there was no need for public defenders, practicing lawyers
and a Ministry of Justice, is the principal state institution
responsible for the implementation of general government policy
62.
As it will be discussed later in the paper, the rivalry was between
two German organizations, GTZ and IRZ. Since 2000, the GTZ and IRZ, two
leading German organizations shifted their focus toward providing the impetus
for domestic reform and regional cooperation for a closer rapprochement with
the European Union. The common areas of work and competence lead to a
serious rivalry among these two organizations for funds which both of them
received from the funds allocated by the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs to
Albania.
63.
The Albanian Constitution is one of the latest constitutions of
Eastern Europe, adopted by a referendum on 28 November 1998.
64.
This is an estimated number from my own experience at the General
Department of Codification in the Ministry of Justice.
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in the field of justice and is generally responsible for justice and
legislative reform.65 Through its Directorate of Codification it has
a central role in the preparation of government‟s legislative
policies and legislation, and most importantly in checking the
compatibility of draft laws and other normative acts.66
The problem with the legislative actors is twofold. As part of
the regulatory scheme, the Constitution empowers the MPs with
the right to initiate legislation. However, as the statistics show, this
right is used in very rare occasions.67 It looks like the
transformation of the society through law is a task serious enough
not to be trusted exclusively to the parliamentarians. Downgrading
the role of Parliament from the legislator into the approver, or
rubber stamp, directly and gravely influences the parliamentarian
basis of the state.68 On the other hand, there is a modus operandi
among the international organizations, governmental sponsored
organizations and the local government and organizations that
foster a culture of self-perpetuation and legitimization for the
conceptualization and implementation of legal reform projects.
These legislative practices effectively restrict access to lawmaking,
and there are no incentives on the part of the main actors to change
the status quo.
The relationship between democratic decision-making and rule
of law principles is a two way street. Just as democracy rests in
considerable measure on the rule of law, the latter rests in turn on
democratic institutions and processes. Hence a balanced
relationship between the rule of law and a democratic legislative
process is needed to ease the transformation of the regimes. The
legislative process in Albania during 20 years of transition displays
chaotic characteristics, giving few opportunities to the public to get
it involved in the lawmaking process.69 In this context the notion of
65.
Law No. 8678, dated 14/05/2001 “On the organization and
Functioning of the Ministry of Justice.”
66.
Id.
67.
Approximately 99% of the laws are initiated outside the parliament,
with the latter always voting in favor of tabled laws. Data from the Albanian
Parliament, www.parlament.al (last visited April 21, 2011).
68.
Albania is a Parliamentary Republic, according to Art. 1 of the
Constitution.
69.
According to the OSCE Legal Sector Report: Albania (2004), public
confidence in the Albanian legal sector is low.
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law as an instrument of reform reflects a top-down approach.
Despite some merits to this approach, the need for bottom-up
considerations takes a more accentuated role in democratic
societies and is a legitimate one in the prism of participatory
democracy.70 Direct participation could increase access to the
political system and greater voters‟ involvement in the legislative
process, thus giving more legitimacy to the system.
IV. CHAPTER TWO: THE TRAFFIC OF LEGAL NORMS
Legal reform does not take place in a vacuum. The need to fill
gaps in a short time, combined with international pressure to
stimulate the need creates an environment that is forced to receive
norms and institutions. This process resembles a sophisticated
system of offer and demand for legal norms.71 Expertise and
financial rewards are key mechanisms to the functioning of the
system. The feasibility of projects relies mostly on the origin of the
organization(s) involved. The more Western an organization is, the
higher the chances for funding and trading in influence. Prestige
carries a lot of weight.
In this chapter, I attempt to elucidate the dark sides of legal
engineering. In particular, I draw attention to the practices of legal
experts and the form of expertise involved in lawmaking in
Albania and Nepal, where I have had the opportunity to witness
first hand how laws are made. I also draw upon some theoretical
frameworks of comparative law to help me navigate and streamline
the information that I gathered while working on legal reform
programs. A particular discussion is dedicated to the workings of
the legislative process, which is contrasted with the Constitution
making process. While I make the argument for more inclusive
participatory politics in lawmaking, I also caution against the

70.
It is obvious that the adoption of Napoleon‟s Civil Code was of
benefit not only for the French society but also it had a strong resonance in other
European countries as well, which as a result of the spill over effect incorporated
that code into their domestic legal systems. On the other hand, the paradoxes
that associated the communist legal reform regarding collectivization and the
crimes against state are an example of seeing the law as a mere instrument of
government.
71.
Ajani, supra note 7, at 97.
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formality of the process as substituting the political will of the
parties.
If law is made to be a means to an end rather than vice versa,
then it follows that it should take into account the moral and social
norms of a particular society.72 According to Merryman, legal
reform either tinkers with the legal system, follows or leads the
social change.73 Two immediate problems are associated with legal
reform projects. The first is the evident mismatch of the supply and
demand of legal norms. The premise of this problem is the
assumption that formalism demands the production of laws. In this
context, pragmatic or dogmatic perspectives on the nature of
transformation stimulate the demand for laws. The second problem
refers to the nature of transplants.74 The multitude of actors and
methodologies for transplanting laws has created a situation where
it is impossible to trace the origin of laws. In this case, transplants
take on a life of their own, losing their original meaning and
intent.75 Frankenberg calls this process of supply and demand of
expertise and laws as “[j]uridic midwives of capitalism . . .
monitored by representatives of supra-or international
organizations they dismantle and overhaul the old normative

72.
But see ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO
COMPARATIVE LAW 97, 109 (1993) (“It follows from the four reflections to this
point that usually legal rules are not peculiarly devised for the particular society
in which they now operate and also that this is not a matter for great concern.”
“. . . The fact is, I believe, that even in theory there is no simple correlation
between a society and its law.”).
73.
John Merryman, Comparative Law and Social Change: On the
Origins, Style, Decline & Revival of the Law and Development Movement, 25
AM. J. COMP. L. 3, 457, 462 (1977).
74.
Jonathan Miller provides a typology of transplants classifying them
as cost-saving transplants, externally dictated transplants, legitimacy generating
transplants, and entrepreneurial transplants. All these types are found
interchangeably in legal reform projects. Usually the entrepreneurial and
legitimacy generating transplants are the most used, although the cost-saving is
often used when there are no administrative capacities able to provide an
analysis of a particular transplant, save the case of a legitimacy generating
transplant. Jonathan M. Miller, A Typology of Legal Transplants: Using
Sociology, Legal History and Argentine Examples to Explain the Transplant
Process, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 4, 839 (2003).
75.
See Michele Graziadei, Legal Transplants and the Frontiers of
Legal Knowledge, 10 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L.: HISTORIES OF LEGAL
TRANSPLANTS
(2009),
available
at:
http://www.bepress.com/til/default/vol10/iss2/art14 (last visited April 21, 2011).
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superstructure, importing, adapting, and transplanting legal
codes.”76
A. The Supply and Demand of Transplants: Diversity of Origins–
Diversity of Results
In one of my early days at the Ministry of Justice in Albania, I
found a folder containing the traveaux préparatoire of the Election
Code. Curiosity took the better of me and I started going through
it. The working group was established under the auspices of the
OSCE, which was very active in 2000 in establishing the rule of
law in the country. Several of its experts were involved in drafting
the Code, which was supposed to cure once and for all whatever
was wrong with Albanian elections. I could not believe the surprise
and sheer amazement I felt when I found in the folder the Election
Code of former Zaire. One needs to be especially skilled in legal
engineering to extract and adapt Mobutu‟s Zaire electoral rules in
order to democratize Albania of 2001. However strange this may
be, it was a part of a larger pattern. The reformatory process in
Albania was characterized by a diversity of approaches and
methods in drafting laws. The result consisted of an amalgam of
laws, broadly taken by the common law tradition and GermanicRoman law.77 Of course, the first draft of the Election code in 2000
had the exotic nuances of Zaire.
A diametrically different experience was in the case of Nepal.
At the Center of Micro-Finance where I was helping with drafting
the legal framework on microfinance, a more inclusive,
participatory process was in place. Most of the relevant
stakeholders were part of a process in which they learnt of our
efforts and at the same time they contributed valuable comments
and suggestions. The draft law was drawn from the experience of
Nepal and from other neighboring countries. This is not to say that
76.
Frankenberg, supra note 13.
77.
For instance, the Civil Code was drafted after the French Code Civil
in the framework of a Council of Europe project, while simultaneously, GTZ
experts drafted the first part of the commercial legislation with the registry of
companies modeled after the French and German legislation. The registration of
private property recently was developed under the auspices of the USAID,
whereas the criminal and criminal procedure code were aligned with the Italian
legislation.
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the final draft was a combination of transplants, at contrary, the
law was entirely home grown on the premise that it benefited from
lessons learned either in Nepal, or in neighboring countries.
Having in mind the reformatory aspect of the law, the legal
framework also reflected international standards of accountability
and good governance. In this way, it was more productive to
engage with a local product that aimed at achieving higher
standards for governance.
There are two direct consequences resulting from the diversity
of the methodologies and projects of the legal reform. First, there
is a sense of confusion or alienation that is derived from the
chaotic nature of the legal system and its incoherence. Second, a
sense that the lack of action on the part of government or private
actors is attributed to the vacuum in legislation. This implies an
urge to adopt more laws in order to bring the country up to date
with modern standards. As it was mentioned in the first Chapter,
generating laws is the measurement of success and efficacy of
public institutions. It is an imposed solution in a closed
administration and civic society catering to the needs of project
awarders. This creates a vicious circle, which perpetuates a need to
adopt new laws every day. In turn, they are practically never
absorbed by the administration itself, by the elite, or by the public.
As an example, shortly after I started working in Albania, during
one of the negotiations in the framework of accession to NATO,
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had no data regarding the UN
conventions ratified by Albania. The large number of adopted laws
and by laws also makes the lawmaking process difficult to
manage.78 It is obvious to say that the process needs management
in order to ensure effectiveness in adoption and in implementation.
Pressure from the interaction with international organizations
and donor countries is being brought to bear on the Executive
branch as well as the Parliament.79 The membership in
78.
A direct result, which is connected with the large number of
normative acts adopted by the Government is the lack of disseminating
information in the communities of lawyers and judges. A shared complaint by
the members of the judiciary is the frequent amendment to laws, and the lack of
codification.
79.
See Robert C. Bergeron, Globalization of the Dialogue on the
Legislative Process, 23 STATUTE L. REV. 85 (2002). Examples include the need
to incorporate structural changes and “rule of law” reforms into domestic law as
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international organizations, such as the WTO for instance, requires
constant assessment of the existing legislation against the
international norms. An element worth mentioning here is that
while there is a vigorous debate in EU circles about the
relationship of WTO norms not only on states individually, but
also on the EU and its institutions. In Albania, the relationship of
domestic law to international law takes a very formalistic, and
dogmatic perspective.80 There is little room for discussion among
judges and other practitioners on whether international law
supercedes national law in whatever form, period. The WTO and
the related treaties, such as WIPO, were ratified in a single session
in Parliament. The prospective membership in the EU brings with
it a requirement for a comprehensive rehaul of legislation in order
to bring it up to EU standards. It also requires the examination of
the entire legislative process to ensure that future laws meet the
required standards. In this latter context, beginner‟s luck was to
accompany me during the first year at the Ministry of Justice. In
one of the office visits by legal experts, I was abruptly introduced
to the world of legal reform projects. Under the goal of
modernizing the legislation, an expert introduced me to the
inefficiencies of the Albanian insolvencies law which was drafted
by his organization some years ago (GTZ). He eloquently argued
that I should inform the Minister about the immediate need to
amend the legislation in order to align it with the acquis. His
organization was only too happy to assist us.
Newton says: “[t]he very term „transplantation,‟ biased
towards the technical, masks the political realities, for „legal
transplantation‟ is always necessarily a species of the genus
legislation. To speak, as comparativists typically do, of
transplantation as „reception‟ is to obscure the political calculations
and complex play of interests behind any modern instance of
importing statutes (or concepts or provisions).”81 Watson on the

a condition for obtaining loans from the World Bank, and the orchestrated
revision of the monetary, banking and fiscal legislation under the conditionality
of the IMF.
80.
See generally ARMIN VON BOGDANDY, EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
AND INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION (2002).
81.
Newton, supra note 12, at 152.
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other hand makes the case that transplantation has occurred all the
time and the modern legal systems are the fruits of massive
transplantations.82 Limited in the technicality of the term, the
reform in changing and aligning legislation with the international
standards and with the EU acquis becomes easier to be
conceptualized and adopted. This approach however misses the
point of how are the transplants incorporated and how are
implemented.
The multitude of national strategies and action plans addressing
particular recommendations can be evaluated twofold.83 Firstly,
there is a lack of coherence among the goals and objectives of legal
reform programs proposed by the interested actors, which results
not only in sporadic implementation, but resonates problems in
codification, and creates the need for repetitious revisions in all
areas of legislation. Secondly, there is a lack of cohesiveness
within a single legal reform project, manifested in terms of
maintaining uniformity and cohesion in conceptualizing goals and
objectives and drafting legislation.
The process of adoption of the NPAA and APIEP was typical
of the Albanian administration. It merits a few words of
explanation to illustrate the process and methodology.84 The
drafting process of the APIEP started in early May 2004 with the
aim of finalizing it by early June. The methodology adopted to
draft the Plan was the result of a “compromise” of two different
EU technical assistance experts assigned to the Ministry of
82.
WATSON, supra note 72.
83.
NPAA, APIEP are instruments regarding the European Union,
whereas the National Strategy for Economic and Social Development was
adopted as a requirement from the World Bank.
84.
See generally European Partnerships for Western Balkans,
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/see/docs/index.htm
(last
visited April 21, 2011). The approximation of legislation is conceptualized in
the National Plan for the Adoption of the Acquis (NPAA), as well as in the
Action Plan for the Implementation of the European Partnerships (APIEP).
These plans contain annual as well as medium term legislative and institutional
building measures. The launch of European Partnerships in 2004, in addition to
the annual preparation of National Plan for the Adoption of Acquis (NPAA), has
put the focus on identifying short and mid-term priorities regarding the
preparations for further integration with the European Union identified in the
Commission‟s 2004 Annual Reports and serves as a checklist against which to
measure progress. The NPAA and the APIEP are developed independently by
national authorities, subject to revisions and monitoring by the technical joint
committees associated country-European Commission.
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European Integration, which had conflicting perspectives and
proposed
different
methodologies.85
The
conflicting
methodological viewpoint, poor training on the part of ministries‟
experts as well as the hermetic process of consultations and
drafting prevented the working group from coming up with a final
draft, even four months after the formal start of the project.86 The
question is not simply that if there were only one set of experts
then the confusion would have been avoided. The problem goes
deeper into the incoherency of strategic objectives.
It is significantly easier to adopt legislation that comes from a
well-established source. The authority of the legislation provides
not only for a broader acceptance in the Parliament but serves as a
legitimacy claim by the Executive versus opposition, and towards
the population at large. The foreign technical expertise, alignment
with the international standards, and the process of
Europeanization of the legislation contain sufficient dosages of
authority to facilitate the adoption of laws. It should be said that
the alignment of the domestic legislation with international
standards is not objectionable in itself. On the contrary, the drive
of formerly oppressed societies towards universalistic virtues
brings much vitality and needed energy. A flaw of this process is
the strong emphasis on product over process that dominates the
reform.87 In this context, the gap, or the contradiction, between the
objectives and results makes the case of a careful review of the
lawmaking process.
The focus over the product is closely connected to the
underlying motives that propel actors to become involved in legal
reform projects. Furthermore, the legal reform projects overlap not
only with regard to their substance, but also with regard to the
actors. Legal reform projects have become a source of income for
85.
One of the projects was intended to support Albania with the
approximation of legislation before the negotiations for the Stabilization and
Association Agreement were opened, preparing the country for them. Thanks to
the Brussels bureaucracy it started some three years later, after the negotiations
started. The second one was of course associated with the development of the
SAA negotiations as technical support to the administration.
86.
The methodologies used for drafting the Plan were revised on a biweekly basis, acting on differing proposals from the two projects‟ expertise.
Needless to say it threw the whole administrative network tasked with preparing
the document into a state of constant chaos and incertitude.
87.
Newton, supra note 12, at 153.
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many NGOs, founded by former or current ministers, or their
wives. The quest for funds bypasses gap analyses on the need for a
particular piece of legislation. The hierarchic and economic
liaisons of the workplace enable many government experts to offer
their expertise in the framework of the projects. In a different spin,
the mobility and rotation in power of existing and former high
level government civil servants influences the conception and
implementation of assistance programs and the division of
projects.
The following example illustrates the dynamic of actors‟
rivalry. In 2000-2001, two leading German organizations, German
Technical Assistance (GTZ) and the German Foundation for
International Legal Cooperation entered the market of
approximation of Albanian legislation with the EU acquis. Both of
them were funded by the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs and
were competing for the same assistance for the Department of
Approximation of Legislation in the Ministry of Justice. The
competitive situation derogated to the point that the intervention of
the German Embassy was necessary to basically remove IRZ from
the approximation of legislation and encourage it to participate in
other activities in the country. The result of the competition among
the legal reform providers is not limited to projects working in the
same area.
The predominant methodology of drafting laws in Albania
consisted largely of transplanting laws or provisions from different
experiences. For instance, the working group on drafting the
copyright law tried to transplant part of the Italian, Romanian and
Greek copyright laws.88 This approach stands in contrast to the
process of approximation of legislation with the acquis. The
requirements of the EU alignment consist of the transposition of
Treaty provisions, regulations and standards of directives into
domestic laws.89 This form of transposition demands a new
88.
The initial version comprising these different parts of the law, was
rejected as being artificial and not aligned with the international standards in
copyright regime and with incorporating EU acquis. The working group in 2004
finalized the drafting of a law, which largely transposed the EC directives in this
field.
89.
The White Paper of the European Council (1994). The EU White
Paper is focused on the need to adopt legislation, which is essential for the
functioning of the internal market. It presents this legislation in a way which
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strategy of drafting laws that differs from a classical transplant
based approach. Instead of eyeing similar legislation in different
Member States, some working groups, for example in the area of
competition and consumer protection, based their work on
standards set by relevant directives and regulations. According to
this approach, the legislation of Member States has a
complimentary role in providing a comparative bases for
evaluating different models and in challenging, or affirming the
assumptions of a particular law, rather than an in promptu
translation and incorporation into the domestic system.
Regardless of sporadic episodes of bringing laws closer to the
social context, the political will and the reformatory goals, the
trend of legal transplants will continue to influence the lawmaking
process. The benefits of comparative law can easily be
demonstrated as lessons learned from other jurisdictions. However,
it can or should not substitute for drafting laws that reflect the
social context, the political will and the reformatory goals. The
accession into the European Union is in itself a great exercise in
reforming the legislation. The approximation of legislation with
100,000 pages of acquis is a process that requires first of all, and at
least, a well-coordinated mechanism in order to prevent frequent
amendments of legislation and to ensure wide acceptance for the
necessary reforms.90 Wider participation of the concerned actors
and public can influence the zeal with which the proponents of EU
advocate swifter lawmaking.
The tendency to adopt and incorporate as many international
agreements as possible and EU acquis comes mainly from the lack

shows the key measures in each sector and those measures which should be
tackled first, but it does not attempt to establish priorities as between sectors. It
also describes in some detail the administrative and organizational structures,
which are required in each sector if the legislation is to be effectively
implemented and enforced.
90.
I do not mean here to imply that the problem with harmonization of
the acquis is exclusively one of coordination, as in that case the remedy would
not be difficult to find. While I address in other works some of the problems
associated with the nature of acquis, as a system, or a body of law that can be
put under a critique of its own regarding its existence as a system, and therefore
its internal coherence, in this paper as I state in the beginning, I take a process
oriented perspective on the implementation of legal reform projects, rather than
a substantive approach to their conceptualization.
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of deliberations in the legislative process. In the situation when it is
fairly easy to initiate a draft law under the label “European
Integration” even the formal requirements of the lawmaking
process become a mere formality. One can pass almost anything as
long as it is properly labeled. The heavier (read powerful) the
authority submitting a draft law, the faster the lawmaking process
works. They are in direct proportion. In this way, they reflect the
contradiction between the need to adopt legislation using the fasttracking parliamentary procedures, in order to speed the pace of
integration, and the need for a greater public deliberation, in order
to ensure the “stakeholders as process owners” perspective.
B. A Comparative Perspective of the Legislative and Constitution
Making Process
In this section, I explore the nuances of the lawmaking process
in two different contexts. The first is a typical procedure that is
used for adopting laws, and it includes both the drafting, and the
passing of the laws by the Parliament. A caveat to that is the
process of adopting EU acquis, which I explain immediately
below. The second context is provided by the process, in which the
Constitution was drafted in 1998. As described earlier in the
Chapter, the large amount of legislation enacted every year,
overlooking the process, contributes to the lack of implementation.
A hypothesis could be raised whether normative acts would have a
better chance of being implemented if a participatory lawmaking
process was in place. In the interest of promoting much discussed
democratic standards of transparency and accountability, such an
approach could vest the system with more legitimacy.
The tension between a participatory lawmaking process and the
product of legal reform projects becomes palpable in the case of
adoption of the EU acquis. The usual legislative procedure is more
preoccupied with ensuring the legality of the process, rather than
establishing the mechanisms for ensuring legitimacy. Prior to the
start of the negotiations for the SAA the approach to legal reform
varied from one actor to the other. As noted earlier, the different
approaches produced a myriad of results. The EU acquis were
almost never taken into consideration by any working groups or
legal reform projects. The laws were drafted to resemble particular
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legislation of different countries, regardless of whether they were
EU Member States or not.
In order to convey the commitment to the European
integration, the Parliament has introduced a de-facto fast-track
parliamentary procedure to pass legislation that aims at
approximating domestic laws with the EU acquis or demands.
Under this procedure, the Parliament has a limited time to review a
particular draft law introduced by the Council of Ministers. The
latter has the sole authority to carry out negotiations and maintain
relations with the EU. According to the annual legislative plans, a
majority of laws come from the EU conditionality for membership.
For fairness sake, the EU is not the only international organization
that wields power. The OSCE, World Bank, IMF, UN, WTO, and
any other donor country have the prerogative to dictate conditions,
and a de facto fast-track procedure is established for adopting laws
coming from these organizations.
The typical law drafting in Albania starts with the preparation
and adoption every January by the Council of Ministers of an
annual legislative plan. It is coordinated through the Department of
Coordination at the Prime Minister‟s Office with the legal
departments of the line ministries and the central institutions.
According to the law “On the Organization and Functioning of the
Council of Ministers,” each ministry sets up working groups to
come up with planned legislative measures. Representatives from
the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of European Integration
are invited to participate in the working groups charged with
drafting normative acts.
After the working group completes the draft, it goes for
revision to the interested line ministries and to the Department of
Coordination, in order to settle disputes and approve the final
version before introducing the draft law for approval in the Council
of Ministers. Although formalized, this procedure is not exclusive
and there have been numerous occasions when draft laws are
introduced outside of this procedure. A sine qua non of the
legislative process is the opinion of the Ministry of Justice for all
normative acts and of the Ministry of European Integration for
those normative acts that affect one of the areas of the acquis.
Pending review and approval by the Council of Ministers, a
draft law is submitted to the relevant Parliamentary commissions
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with jurisdiction on the subject area of the draft law and always to
the Legal Affairs Commissions. Although members of Parliament
have the legislative initiative, very few laws are adopted by the
MP‟s initiative. It could be stated that the Parliament in a
Parliamentary Republic has relinquished its legislative role by
giving the Executive branch a quasi monopoly on legislation.
Formally, meetings of parliamentary commissions are open and
MPs reserve the right to invite experts to discuss proposed laws.
The process is intended to be deliberative. Actually, proceedings
before parliamentary commissions are routine matters, where there
is almost no deliberation. Rarely does anyone read the texts of a
proposed legislative acts. Unless a proposed law is of a political
nature, all others are adopted, almost always unanimously. After
adoption by the relevant commissions, a report is prepared
regarding the status of the draft law. In case members of the
commissions have reservations regarding the draft law, they are
included in the report.
Regarding the incorporation of international agreements into
the domestic law, the situation is even simpler. Few would dare to
run counter the “will” of integration and the internationalization of
the legal system. A draft law incorporating the agreement is sent
for opinion to the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of foreign
Affairs. The process of reviewing the international agreements is
practically non-existent. The pressure to modernize the laws, and
to have friendly relations with all international organizations and
donor countries, influences the depth of reviewing the contents of
international agreements. The proceedings before the
Parliamentary commissions also in this case are quite fast and
without much debate.
In this respect, the membership in the WTO was a perfect
example of the hermetic nature of the legislative process. Most of
the interested communities, the local producers, did not have a
chance to participate in the negotiations and the preparatory work
for concluding the membership agreement. Six yeas after the
accession to the WTO, most of the business community frequently
demands the renegotiation of the membership agreement, and the
renegotiation of all free trade agreements with various countries.
The seriousness of the matter was taken into consideration by

98

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 4

political parties in their election campaigns of July 2005,
promising to renegotiate all the concerned agreements.
From a purely formalist position, it should be noted that there
is no law guaranteeing citizens the opportunity to become part of
the process of drafting laws, and this affects all ministries. As there
is no legal provision that would require the Ministry of Justice to
regulate public participation in drafting laws, the Ministry of
Justice sees itself under no legal obligation to do so.
Access to law is an essential element of any state governed by
the rule of law, and a problematic area that I tried to raise in this
paper. However, despite the obvious benefits of an open minded
approach to public participation, a right to public participation is
not a recipe for success, and it‟s worth looking at some of its dark
sides and blind spots. Apart from the traditional means of
publicizing the law such as “official gazettes,” information
technology is now extensively used to enable wide-ranging
possibilities for electronic access to legal texts. Public participation
should not be taken to mean voting, as for example electing a
constitutional convention or ratifying a constitutional text by a
referendum. At its best, participatory constitutionalism works and
counteracts the arguments in support of elite negotiation as the sole
effective model.
The Constitution making process reflects the greater
participation that attempted to lend legitimacy to the product.
Although, by contrast to the traditional process of lawmaking, the
Constitution making process was much more participatory and
deliberative, the political boycotting by the opposition party
contributed to the anemic nature of the final product.91 With this
caution in mind, it is worth contrasting these two lawmaking
processes to highlight the nature of participation and deliberation.
It is also necessary to emphasize the important role of mechanisms
that are needed to ensure the right to participate and deliberate.
During the process of drafting the Albanian Constitution,
Frankenberg wrote about the rules that would guide the legislative
process: (1) institutions must be simple; (2) functions must be
91.
It should be said that while the Constitution suffers from a lack of
enforcement, due to its problematic substantive elements, and the initial political
taint, the process of making it represents an interesting practice worth studying
and illustrating.
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clearly divided among the institutions; (3) the legislative process
must be transparent; (4) the legislative process must be efficient (as
guaranteed by public scrutiny); and (5) popular participation must
be permitted.92
Despite the practice of a participatory lawmaking process that
characterized the Constitution making process, the supreme law of
the country does not contain a single provision for the public
access in the lawmaking process. The process of drafting the
Constitution took into account the need for a wide participatory
approach in order to best exploit the resources of local and
international NGOs, and reflect the perspectives of the local
experts and of the public in a more general tone.
The Administrative Center for the Coordination of Assistance
and Public Participation (ACCAPP), a joint initiative of
ABA/CEELI, GTZ, and OSCE, served as a liaison between and
among Albanian and international participants in the constitutional
drafting process.93 Its function was to ensure that all interested
parties had the opportunity to participate fully and to avoid
duplicative and conflicting initiatives.94 As such it was working to
create a program of public participation. It solicited assistance
from Albanian NGOs and international donors to provide
materials, training, and financial assistance to develop strategies
for organizing assistance and promoting public participation in the
constitutional drafting process.95
The program that they managed to put together consisted of
two phases, collecting input into the drafting of the Constitution,
and submitting draft provisions to the public for comment.96
92.
Günter Frankenberg, notes from THE THREE POWERS SYMPOSIUM
ON THE CONSTITUTION-MAKING IN ALBANIA (May 13-15, 1998).
93.
Scott Carlson & Molly Inman, Forging a Democratic Constitution:
Transparency and Participation in the 1998 Albanian Constitutional Process. In
the Fall of 2003, the US Institute of Peace in cooperation with the UNDP
organized a series of workshops with experts on constitution making practices. I
was invited to participate as a country expert in the workshop of the Constitution
making in Albania. In the workshop we discussed the findings of Scot Carlson‟s
paper, as well as debated the legitimacy questions of public participation and the
politicization of the Constitution making process.
94.
SCOTT CARLSON & MOLLY INMAN, FORGING A DEMOCRATIC
CONSTITUTION: TRANSPARENCY AND PARTICIPATION IN THE 1998 ALBANIAN
CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS.
95.
Id.
96.
Id.
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Throughout the duration of the program, its officers traveled all
over Albania to generate public awareness and participation in the
constitution making process. The results of these fora provided
Commission members and its technical staff with a basic outline of
the issues that the public considered important.97 In a second
phase, the review of the constitution was largely done by
individuals and organizations either in Albania or abroad.98 This
public review was in addition to the drafting consultations
provided by foreign experts.99 This approach by the ACCAPP
provided at least a mechanism to ensure wider participation in the
lawmaking process.
Although the Constitution drafting project involved input
gathering on a national scale, it did not provide answers to the
methodologies adopted to filter the information gathered from the
public participation into the drafting. The problem was threefold.
The first was the relation of the political class to the final outcome.
The Democratic Party, the major opposition force in the country
was opposed to a Constitution being drafted by the Socialist,
whom they considered to have come to power through a Bolshevik
like revolution after the collapse of the financial sector in early
1997. They did not consider the government to be legitimate, and
they did not support the process as they perceived it to being
controlled and manipulated by the Socialists and their allies, even
among the international actors. Hence, the final product, the
Constitution, which was adopted formally by a referendum on 28
November 2008, purposely coinciding with the National
Independence Day, did not have the full backing of the political
elite. The second was the perceived role of the international
community in legitimizing the process and product. The public
perception at that time was that while making a constitution is
generally viewed with optimism, the process and product were
perceived to be too much controlled by the government and the
international actors. In other words, the public perception was that
yes, it is good that a constitution is being drafted, but we do not
have any influence in it whatsoever. The third was the relation of
97.
98.
99.

Id.
Id.
Id.
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selected expertise and opinions generated in town hall meetings
and the final product. Despite the fact that this exercise formally
introduced the concept of the public as a participant in the
lawmaking process, and as such constituted a break from the
established mentality of closed doors working groups, without
adequate methodological framework and proper safeguards it did
not guarantee that the public input would find its way in the final
draft.100
The legal framework establishes virtually no formal
opportunities for public participation in governmental and
parliamentary decision-making.101 The relationship between the
government, NGOs, and the public is a complicated one. Because
of the lack of procedures for incorporating public input, relations
between the government and the public and NGO community
depend heavily on the discretion of governmental officials. The
predominant attitude among government and parliamentary
officials is that public participation hinders the lawmaking process
instead of improving it. Moreover, public administration tends to
show interest in public participation in the lawmaking and policy
preparations process only when it expects that the public will
approve of their intended decisions.
The law on the Council of Ministers, and the regulations on
Parliamentary commissions do not prohibit the participation of
other experts in the drafting process, but in the absence of an
explicit provision and mechanism to ensure it, the right to invite
outside experts is left to the discretion of MPs. There is a
contradiction in the proceedings of the working groups. When a
particular law is part of a legal reform project, the project experts
100. For instance, Frankenberg‟s article Stranger than Paradise,
provides an example of a typical working group. Two to three local experts and
a foreign consultant, tasked with drafting a major law, such as the
Administrative Procedure Code. This practice until early 2000 was well
trenched in the set up and proceedings of the working groups.
101. Law no. 9000, dated 30/01/2003 “On the Organization and
Functioning of the Council of Ministers”. Article 24 of the law provides:
1. The initiators send the draft acts along with an explanatory
memo on the goal, objectives and the substance of the draft act for
opinion to the interested ministries and other institutions.
2. In any case, the draft acts, with the exception of those with an
individual character, are sent for opinion to the Ministry of Justice,
on the legality of their form and substance.
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have a rather strong voice in the proceedings and in the final
outcome of the law. However, if an interested NGO or a concerned
community were to ask to participate in some of the meetings of
the working groups, the decision to invite or not would be the
chairperson‟s alone. Taking into consideration the past practices of
lawmaking, the need for public consultations should be explicitly
provided in the law rather than left to the discretion of the
administration. The only direct participation by the public in
governance and government consists on electing representatives to
the Parliament.
V. CHAPTER THREE: PROPOSALS FOR THE FUTURE OF THE
LAWMAKING PROCESS
How legislation is made, and of course what it says, are equally
important and complementary. Process has become equally as
important as the content of the final document for the legitimacy of
legislation.102 The previous Chapters analyzed the contradiction
among rules, and the deficits of the legislative process. In this
Chapter, I discuss some perspectives on filling the gap between the
law in the book and the law in action through greater participation
in lawmaking and evaluation of legislation. From a political
science perspective, Archon Fung juxtaposes the representative
democracy with the participatory democracy. Fung highlights the
democratic deficit of the policy making process where preferences
are not matched by outcomes and where deliberation or
participation is absent from the lawmaking process. Underlying the
potential disruption of representative institutions, Fung nonetheless
proposes that “for countries where patron-client exchanges are
highly stable, entrenched and reinforcing dynamics of a policy-

102. Writers such as Daniel Berkowitz and Katharina Pistor have
respectively focused on the legality and effectiveness aspects of the legal
reform, and the need for legal professionals to embrace the laws in order to
ensure effectiveness. This is another occasion to emphasize that my focus in this
paper has been on the need to ensure broader participation by the public in order
to enhance the legitimacy of the process and products of legal reform projects,
rather than their legality. Daniel Berkowitz et al., The Transplant Effect, 51 AM.
J. COMP. L. 1, 163 (2003); Katharina Pistor, The Standardization of Law and Its
Effect on Developing Economies, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 97 (2002).

2011]

TRANSITION WITHOUT TRANSFORMATION

103

making process, participatory reform may be an effective
corrective.”103
In the context of an emerging right for public participation in
democratic governance, Thomas Franck wrote that the legitimacy
of governments will be measured by international law and
process.104 The right to public participation in democratic
governance exists today in international law. This right packs a
moral punch but it lacks legal teeth and effective enforcement.
Does this right extend from everyday governance to the process of
constitution making? The United Nations Committee on Human
Rights has recognized a specific right to participate in constitution
making. The Aarhus Convention, even though a regional
instrument, fortified the concept of public participation.105

103. Archon Fung, Democratizing the Policy Process, in PUBLIC POLICY
669 (Michael Moran et al. eds., 2006). On an extreme use of anti-representative
institutions, Bruce Cain and Kenneth Miller discuss the role of populist politics
as opposed to progressive politics and representative democracy in undermining
the legislature ability to set the policy agenda, frame policy options, balance
competing interests, and protect minority rights. Bruce E. Cain & Kenneth P.
Miller, Populist Legacy: Initiatives and the Undermining of Representative
Government, in DANGEROUS DEMOCRACY? THE BATTLE OVER BALLOT
INITIATIVES IN AMERICA 33 (Larry J. Sabato et al. eds., 2001).
104. Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic
Governance, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 46, 50 (1992).
105. A ruling in 1991 of the UNCHR, acting in its judicial capacity to
hear individual complaints under Optional Protocol I to the ICCPR, in the case
of Marshall v. Canada (Human Rights Committee, CCPR/C/43/D/205/1986, 3
December 1991). This was a case brought in 1986 and decided five years later,
first authorized a specific right to participate in constitution making as an
undoubted part of public affairs. The right to participate in constitution making
might logically be derived from the general meaning of “democratic
participation” in the UN Declaration of Human Rights (1948, Article 21) and
especially Article 25 of the ICCPR (a covenant agreed in 1966 and entered into
force in 1976). Article 25 establishes a right to participate in public affairs, to
vote, and to have access to public service: “Every citizen shall have the right and
the opportunity . . . without unreasonable restrictions: (a) to take part in the
conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives; (b) to
vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal
suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of
the will of the electors; (c) to have access, on general terms of equality, to public
service in his country.” The right of public to participate was also recognized by
the UNECE Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in
Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, adopted on 25
June 1998.
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and

It is of interest to study how international law deals with the
access to legal norms and what we can learn from the EU response.
The right of public participation to legal norms and legislative
process has been recognized in international law. Such an
instrument is the Convention on Access to Information, Public
Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in
Environmental Matters. It was adopted on 25 June 1998, in the
Danish city of Aarhus at the Fourth Ministerial Conference in the
“Environment for Europe” process. The Convention, although it
relates to the environmental issues, represents the most advanced
instrument that regulates the right to public participation. Since
signing the Convention in 1998, the EU has taken important steps
to update existing legal provisions in order to meet the
requirements of the Aarhus Convention by adopting directives for
the Member States, but also for its own institutions. In particular,
two directives106 concerning access to environmental information
and public participation in environmental decision-making (“first”
and “second pillar” of the Aarhus Convention) were adopted by the
European Parliament and the Council in 2003. They have to be
implemented in national law respectively by 14 February and 25
June 2005.
The Convention adopts a rights-based approach and establishes
minimum standards to be achieved, but does not prevent any Party
from adopting measures which go further in the direction of
providing access to information, public participation or access to
justice.107 Article 6 of the Convention establishes certain public
participation requirements for decision-making on whether to
license or permit certain types of activity listed in Annex I to the
Convention. The “public concerned” is defined as „the public
affected or likely to be affected by, or having an interest in, the
106. Council & Parliament Directive 2003/4/EC of 28 January 2003 On
Public Access to Environmental Information and Repealing Council Directive
90/313/EEC, (OJ L 41 of 14.02.2003, p. 26), Directive 2003/35/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 26 May 2003.
107. The UNECE Convention on Access to Information, Public
Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental
Matters (1998).
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environmental decision-making,‟ and explicitly includes NGOs
promoting environmental protection and meeting any requirements
under national law.108
The public participation requirements include: timely and
effective notification of the public concerned; reasonable
timeframes for participation, including provision for participation
at an early stage; the right for the public concerned to inspect
information which is relevant to the decision-making process free
of charge; an obligation of the decision-making body to take due
account of the outcome of the public participation; and prompt
public notification of the decision, with the text of the decision and
the reasons and considerations on which it is based being made
publicly accessible.109 What is important in this picture for us is to
take into consideration the spirit and scope of its provisions.
The aim of all legislative work is to produce relatively good
laws, because to produce absolutely good laws means to attain
justice and justice is an ideal.110 The mechanic process of adopting
laws in Albania has contributed to a large number of adopted laws
over a relatively short period of time. As the previous Chapters
illustrated, this tendency has provoked a lack of transparency, and
this also is reflected in the quality of legislation. Part of the blame
can be attributed to the handicaps of the lawmaking process: i.e.
the deficiencies in the functioning of the supply and demand
scheme for legal norms, which contribute to what I call the
inflation of legislation. The problems are also reflected in the
inadequate time for reflection and reviews, as well as in a greater
isolation between the Executive and other branches of the
government.
According to the Council of Europe, evaluation of the effects
of laws is a relatively recent development in Europe. Its growing
importance is related to changes in the form of legislation. Modern
legislation has taken the form of programs, which are targeted to
achieve certain goals; therefore, the traditional verification of the
legality of legislation should be gradually accompanied or
108.
109.
110.

Id.
Id.
COUNCIL OF EUROPE, EVALUATION OF LEGISLATION, PROCEEDINGS
OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE‟S LEGAL CO-OPERATION AND ASSISTANCE
ACTIVITIES (2000-2001) (2001).

106

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 4

combined with the evaluation of the effects of legislation.111 The
most frequently mentioned evaluation criteria are the effectiveness,
efficacy and efficiency. The focus is on the content of the law
rather than on the procedures of collecting the input of the target
populations into the given legislation.
The approach taken by the Council of Europe with respect to
evaluation of legislation restricts itself to the effect and the
implementation of the legislation. Little is said about the need to
evaluate the legislative process itself. This approach focuses on the
technicality of the lawmaking process, leaving outside political,
economical, and social factors that are the driving forces of
legislation.112
In this context, legislative evaluation is seen as an
indispensable aspect of the democratic debate. In order to fully
play its part in ensuring legal certainty, evaluation cannot be
restricted to purely financial concerns or consistency of the legal
order, but must also monitor how efficacious, efficient and
effective a given norm is, as well as any other expected or
unexpected effects. There should be provisions for evaluation at
the time of travaux préparatoires, so as to foresee the effects (ex
ante evaluation), and during the implementation, so as to be able to
draw conclusions about the legislation‟s content and the
implementation methods (ex post evaluation).113
In this framework, evaluation of legislation is thought to be an
element of the sociology of legislation as well as an essential part
of legislative methodology. Unlike legislative drafting, it concerns
the material and substantial aspects of legislation rather than its
formal aspects. It is particularly concerned with the relation
between normative contents and their consequences in the social
111. Id.
112. Id. Legislative evaluation is a necessary discipline, but it has still to
be widely developed in all European countries. Every Council of Europe
member state or candidate for membership should independently look into the
question and set itself the goal, when drafting legislation, of establishing
machinery that makes it possible to have a better understanding of the
legislation‟s impact. As part of its ADACS legal co-operation program, the
Council of Europe might encourage and support these efforts by organizing both
bilateral activities and discussion among all the countries in the program, and by
developing, in partnership with national and NGO bodies concerned, networks
for monitoring and exchange of information and experience . . . ”
113. Supra note 110.

2011]

TRANSITION WITHOUT TRANSFORMATION

107

reality, in the “real world.”114 Therefore, it is imperative to
emphasize the nexus between the substance and procedure of
lawmaking.
The analytical or theoretical model underlying the methodical
approach to be used for preparing legislation considers the
legislative process as a reiterative learning process.115 It is a
process in which the evaluation of the effects of legislation is one
of the fundamental prerequisites and tools for learning. A process,
in which the responsiveness of the legislator to social reality and
the social adequacy of legislative action should be guaranteed.
Taking into consideration that the Europeanization of
legislation is the single biggest legal reform, much attention is
needed to provide a scrupulous process of reviewing legislation
initiated by the executive in the framework of the Europeanization
of legislation.116 The establishment of the necessary domestic
participatory and evaluation mechanism becomes relevant when
considering that the EU does its homework quite well. Through the
introduction of TAIEX programs in Albania, EU evaluates the
Albanian legislation on an automatic basis.117 Every month, line
ministries and the Ministry of European Integration are obliged to
update a list of all normative acts adopted by the Council of
Ministers and the Parliament in a database monitored by the
European Commission TAIEX office. This process evaluates how
many laws are adopted in a particular area and their level of
compatibility with the acquis. During the implementation of the
Stabilization and Association Process joint working groups and
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. In addition to international instruments on evaluating legislation,
renown law and development scholars, Bob and Ann Seidman, have done
remarkable work in preparing manuals for lawyers on drafting and evaluating
legislation. ROBERT SEIDMAN ET AL., LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING FOR DEMOCRATIC
SOCIAL CHANGE: A MANUAL FOR DRAFTERS (Kluwer Law International 2001);
and ASSESSING LEGISLATION: A MANUAL FOR LEGISLATORS (Boston University
School of Law 2003).
117. TAIEX is the Technical Assistance and Information Exchange
instrument managed by the Directorate-General Enlargement of the European
Commission. TAIEX supports partner countries with regard to the
approximation, application and enforcement of EU legislation. It is largely
demand driven and facilitates the delivery of appropriate tailor-made expertise
to address issues at short notice. http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/taiex/what-istaiex/index_en.htm (last visited April 21, 2011).
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committees evaluate the implementation of the agreement and ex
officio as well as the enforcement of legislation. The concern here
is not about preserving nationalist, or culturalist sensitivities. It is
more about providing alternatives and achieving a higher standard
of comparison and evaluation rather than the basic level of
alignment with the acquis.
There are few aspects that merit attention when talking about
the effectiveness of evaluation. What I find missing and consider
worth noticing is the important question of the subjects of the
evaluation. Answers to these questions raise identity prerogatives
for the executive and parliament. In this context, taking into
account the shift in power from the legislature to the executive
branch, regulatory agencies and the courts, it is about time to give
something back to the lawmakers.
B. Reflections on Public Participation
The typology of critique against public participation is usually
made in the context of lawmaking initiatives in America. Whereas
my argument does not involve direct democracy, but calls for
greater participation in the lawmaking process using the existing
institutions of the representative democracy, nonetheless it is
worthwhile to bring up the critique and discuss how it is refuted.
The critique against forms of direct democracy in lawmaking
highlights the role of special interests in formulating policies, the
inexperience and incompetence of voters in conceptualizing policy
proposals and formulating laws, and the risk for infringing
minority rights.118 In an empirical study, Elisabeth Gerner refutes
the critique by showing that the evidence fails to support the
claims that there are more special interests involved in lawmaking
initiatives, and that the voters are uninformed.119 Whereas, there
118. Elisabeth R. Gerber, The Logic of Reform: Assessing Initiative
Reform Strategies, in DANGEROUS DEMOCRACY? THE BATTLE OVER BALLOT
INITIATIVES IN AMERICA 143 (Larry J. Sabato et al. eds., 2001).
119. Id. Furthermore, in the context of greater participation in the
lawmaking process, an experiment was conducted in British Columbia where a
Citizens‟ Assembly was created by the Government of British Columbia with
the unanimous support of the B.C. Legislature. It was an independent, nonpartisan assembly of citizens who examined the province‟s electoral system. The
Citizens‟ Assembly had 160 members, one man and one woman from each of
B.C‟s 79 provincial electoral districts (constituencies) plus two Aboriginal
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could be a potential to harm minority interests, Gerner uses a
Madisonian argument to conclude that risks could be mitigated by
controlling the effects rather than the causes of antiminority
tendencies.120
According to Fuller, non-publication of law, contradictory
rules, and a gap between law and implementation are among the
elements that contribute to failing to make law.121 In the context of
implementation, well-designed institutions are not the only answer,
since the best institutions will fail in making law effective unless
both officials and citizens display general attitudes of respect and
compliance, unless, that is, they have a view of legal rules as
binding.
Every single report on Albania evidences the relatively sound
legal base, and the drastic lack of implementation. There are
several factors that contribute to the failure of law, starting from
socio-anthropological arguments on the attitude of Mediterranean
populations towards formalized rules, lack of clarity in adopted
legislation, lack of administrative capacities and resources,
incoherence of proposed laws and of the system they intend to
build, as well as a lack of political will to implement the reforms
and recommendations of the international community. In a report
about the state of the judiciary in Albania, the lack of
professionalism and discipline, lack of implementation, conflicting
and arbitrary legal interpretations, the lack of coherence and
consistency in the law itself and its application form a set of

members. They were representative of the province as a whole, and worked for
all British Columbians. Members were picked by random draw from a pool that
reflected the gender, age and geographical make-up of British Columbia. They
spent 11 months in 2004 studying electoral systems in use around the world,
holding public hearings, accepting public submissions, and finally reached a
decision on a new electoral system, which was put to voters in a referendum.
The process was divided into three phases where they learnt about the electoral
systems, held public hearings, and deliberated on the new system. This
experiment emphasized the relevance of greater participation in the lawmaking
process and the use of alternative mechanisms to the usual institutions of a
representative
democracy.
Information
Data
available
at
http://www.citizensassembly.bc.ca/public/inaction (last visited April 21, 2011).
120. Id.
121. L.L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (New Haven: Yale University
Press 1964).
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challenges for the law enforcement authorities.122 The list is long,
and one can attribute the failure to almost anything. Distinguishing
chaff from grain is the persuasiveness and cohesiveness of
arguments. The “production” of laws, as commodities, has
certainly negatively influenced their coherence and quality vis-àvis clarity and precision. Legislative problems are universal
problems; they should be dealt with in a multidisciplinary way, as
they have a theoretical as well as a practical dimension.
The legislative loophole in the Albanian legislation regarding
the participation in the lawmaking process has contributed to
minimal initiatives to get the public to participate in the legislative
drafting process throughout the years. Adding to the confusion, it
has also led to inadequate publicizing of draft laws and poorly
developed media contacts that would allow the process to be open
to the public, not mentioning the failure to publish adopted law and
by laws. With the exception of some isolated cases, the public
generally has not played an active part in the process of legislative
drafting.123 This pattern fuels the hypotheses that enacted laws lack
sufficient transparency and are predestined not to be implemented.
In order to open this process and ensure that the public has a
voice in the process of drafting legislation the executive should and
in some sporadic cases has started working to provide proper
conditions to achieve participation, especially through the open
invitations via such simple mass media as internet. The lack of a
clear obligation or the lack of capacities cannot constitute excuses
for not allowing interested groups to play an active role in
lawmaking. Developing the necessary legal standards for
determining when public participation is required and educating
the public about the importance of public participation in
legislative drafting are of primary importance, and would directly
122. Roland Miklau, The Albanian Judicial System and Access to Legal
Information, in LAW IN TRANSITION (EBRD Autumn, 2009),
www.ebrd.com/downloads/research/law/lit092.pdf (last visited April 21, 2011).
123. OSCE Legal Sector Report: Albania (2004). For example, public
participation in discussions related to legislation package on NFO-s, draft laws
on environmental issues (which reflects the obligation required by the
“Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making
and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters,” signed in Aarhus, Denmark on
25 June 1998 and entered into force on 30 October 2001, ratified by Albania on
27 June 2001).
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contribute to the quality and legitimacy of the laws. In the words of
Vivien Hart “[t]he context of a traditional constitution, presumed
to stand above and to structure democratic politics, the extension
of democratic process to include free, open, and responsive
discussion of the constitutional settlement itself represents a radical
departure, but one that attempts to overcome the problems of entry
of new participants and of an equal voice for all concerned
regardless of their expertise.”124 It would also encourage citizens to
participate in the various associations that would be involved in the
process of commenting on legislation, thereby instilling important
civic virtues.125
Innovative ways to bring about great participation are usually
commendable, but when in shortage, valuable tools can be used
from other practices. Comparisons with the U.S. notice and
comment practices can thus be a starting point.126 In order to make
these methods work efficiently in practice, there must be proper
methodological mechanisms guaranteeing sufficient and real
participation. The most important ones are the dissemination of
information (public notice of and access to the latest drafts, either
through the production and publication of information leaflets or
through media and internet coverage), the creation of concrete
possibility of organizations and interested parties to comment on
existing draft laws at various stages, and ensuring that hearings are
held at a time and in a manner that it is truly possible for comments
to be evaluated and the final decisions to be influenced.127
It should be stressed that these are not simply matters of
ensuring citizen rights, though they do enhance democratic
principles. By allowing sufficient participation in the drafting
process, the public administration can avoid considerable amounts
124. See Vivien Hart, Democratic Constitution Making: Special Report,
United States Institute of Peace 107 (2003).
125. OSCE LEGAL SECTOR REPORT: ALBANIA (2004).
126. For an account of the need to adopt notice and comment procedure
in European law see Francesca Bignami, The Democratic Deficit in European
Community Rulemaking: A Call for Notice and Comment Comitology, 40
HARVARD INT‟L L. J. 451 (1999) (Bignami identifies an inadequacy in the
rulemaking procedures in the European Union that fuels the democratic deficit
and argues for the adoption of a revised notice and comment procedure in order
to allow for greater participation but for a reduced role of courts and interest
groups in light of cross-cultural differences in beliefs and interest organizations).
127. OSCE, supra note 125.
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of criticism after laws have been passed. Participation also ensures
the anticipation of a wider range of potential problems with the
draft laws, thus lessening the need to amend legislation at a later
stage. Despite the criticism of participatory-like arrangements and
their shortcomings in lawmaking procedures, the situations that I
analyzed earlier in the paper indicate an urgent need to reform the
reform. Extracting the legislative process from the incubator to a
more open and mature environment cannot help but bring healthier
products and legitimacy to them.
VI. CONCLUSION
The co-existence of parallel processes in the modernization
project, transformation and deliberation, formalism and
informalism, legality and legitimacy, is nothing new, but what is
experienced daily in most of the transitioning societies. The
relationship of local values with prescriptions from the center is
subject to a legitimacy test. In other words, there has to be a
process where the local permeates the universal, and where the
universal at the same time gradually influences the local.128
Therefore, how law is made does matter. It matters whether groups
and the population at large are able to contribute to the process.129
A claim of necessity for participation is based on the assumption
that the outcomes will have the legitimacy as coming from the
right way of channeling the political power that resides in
individuals. Thus participation has the potential, although not
exclusively, to become a criterion of a legitimacy process.
Lawmaking can no longer be confined exclusively to the domain
of “high politics” and negotiations among elites. What needs to be
avoided is exactly the tendency to favor legality over legitimacy.

128. See GLYN MORGAN, THE IDEA OF A EUROPEAN SUPERSTATE: PUBLIC
JUSTIFICATION AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION (2005). Morgan discusses the
Europeanization process as one in which the periphery transform itself following
the conditions of the center, while simultaneously the center is transformed by
the periphery.
129. See Galligan, supra note 32, at 23.

